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1. Introduction 
In 1965, Hans Kornhuber and Luder Deecke made a discovery that greatly 
influenced the study of voluntary action. Using electroencephalography 
(EEG), they showed that when aligning some tens of trials to movement 
onset and averaging, a slowly decreasing electrical potential emerges over cen-
tral regions of the brain. It starts l second ( s) or so before the onset of the 
voluntary action1 and continues until shortly after the action begins. They 
termed this the Bereitschaftspotential, or readiness potential (RP; Kornhuber 
& Deecke, 1965).2 This became the first well-established neural marker of vol-
untary action. In that, the RP allowed for more objective research on volun-
tary action rather than its previous dependence on subjective introspection. 
Two decades later, the RP captured the attention of the wider neuroscience 
community as well as of philosophers, legal scholars, and laypeople. This is be-
cause it was associated with a key question in the debate on free will: Is human 
voluntary action caused by the conscious intention to act? Or does the conscious 
experience only follow unconscious neural activity, which is the true origin of 
that action, and over which humans have only-limited immediate control? 
2. The Libet and Follow-Up Experiments-
Readiness Potential and Intention 
What associated the RP with free will was the seminal empirical work of 
Benjamin Libet and colleagues. Initially they found that endogenous acts that 
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are spontaneously capricious in origin (e.g., flexing the wrist or a finger at a 
time of one's choice, for no reason or purpose and with no consequences) are 
also preceded by an RP (Libet, Wright, & Gleason, 1982). Theywere then sur-
prised by the relatively early onset of RP-over 1 s (one second) before move-
ment onset. And they wanted to know how long before action onset people 
became aware of their urge or intention to move.3 One possibility was that 
subjects' awareness of the intention to move also appeared early before move-
ment onset, potentially reflecting a long lag between the time they decided to 
act and the moment they executed the action. Alternatively, it could be that 
subjects' awareness actually followed-rather than co-occurred with or pre-
ceded-the onset of the RP, in which case one may speculate that this aware-
ness is not part of the causal chain leading to action. 
These competing hypotheses were put to an empirical test in what is now 
commonly known as the Libet experiment (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 
1983). But how does one measure the onset of intention? Lacking a reli-
able neural marker, Libet's solution was to use introspection:4 subjects were 
instructed to flex their right wrist or finger whenever they felt like doing so 
and report the position of a rotating spot on a dock when they first felt the 
urge to move. The authors termed this reported time of urge onset W time 
(W apparently stands for "wanting" to move). They then famously found that 
while W time begins about 200 milliseconds (ms) before movement onset, 
on average, the RP starts at least 550 ms prior to movement onset. 
Since their publication, Libet's results have fostered ongoing discussions, 
debates, and criticism and have inspired many further experiments.5 For 
instance, Keller and Heckhausen (1990) replicated the original Libet results, 
and also compared the RP generated there to RPs generated before hand 
movements that were initiated unconsciously-that is, while the subjects 
were occupied by another, attention-grabbing but unrelated cognitive task. 
They found the latter RPs to be significantly smaller and of more lateral ori-
gin, and suggested that the Libet task, which instructs subjects to time and 
report urges to move, led normally unconscious processes to become con-
scious due to attentional amplification. 
Haggard and Eimer (1999) independently replicated the original Libet 
results as well. They too expanded on them, first by allowing subjects to decide 
both when and which hand to move, and second by computing the lateral-
ized readiness potential (LRP; a variant of the RP that distinguishes between 
the neural signals that precede left versus right hand movements and generally 
begins in closer temporal proximity to movement onset). Their aim was to test 
whether RP was part of the causal chain leading to the intention to act. So they 
investigated whether earlier W times are accompanied by earlier RP onsets, 
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and they failed to find such a correlation. They did, however, find that LRP 
onset co-varied with W time, leading them to suggest that LRP rather than 
RP may be at least partially causal in generating awareness of the intention to 
move. However, Schlegel et al. (2013) were not able to replicate the correlation 
ofLRP and W time with a larger group of participants using several variations 
of the analysis techniques used by Haggard and Eimer ( 1999 ). And Trevena 
and Miller (2002) showed that LRP may in fact follow rather than precede 
W time. Moreover, in later work, Trevena and Miller (2oIO) showed that RPs 
and LRPs occurring before decisions to move were not significantly different 
from these signals preceding decisions not to move. Thus, one possibility is 
that the RP and LRP are related to general readiness to act rather than to the 
specific decision to act now (Pockett & Purdy, 2on). And there appears to be 
no clear-cut evidence that either RP or LRP are neural markers of intention 
onset, or that they are part of the causal chain leading to intention. 
In another study that used the Libet task, Sirigu et al. (2004) showed that 
patients who suffered from parietal lesions due to stroke could correctly report 
the onset of their movement time, but were not able to report W time. This is in 
contrast to cerebellar patients who could report both movement and W times 
like healthy subjects. Lafargue and Duffau ( 2008) further specified these results, 
reporting that they could not be replicated in patients with surgical resection 
of the inferior parietal lobule (that was performed due to slowly evolving brain 
tumors). They suggest that this specific part of the parietal cortex is of interest 
because it was demonstrated to be involved in various aspects of awareness of 
voluntary action and in the sense of agency. They further speculate that, taken 
together, the two studies indicate that the conscious experience of intending to 
act could be at least partially compensated following brain damage. 
In sum, Libet's claim that the onset of RP (a slow-wave brain negativity 
preceding voluntary action, on average over many trials aligned to move-
ment onset) precedes the W time (the reported timing of the first urge to 
move) appears valid given the independent corroborating studies. Yet, these 
follow-up studies also specify more clearly the conditions under which RP 
could be a neural precursor of voluntary action and seem to show that RP is 
not a neural marker of intention. 
3. Further Criticism of the Li bet Experiment 
and the Readiness Potential 
In addition to follow-up work extending the original findings, the Libet 
experiment also garnered a lot of criticism. Much of that criticism focused 
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on the seemingly implicit assumptions behind the experiment. The early cri-
tique ofLatto (1985) focused on the choice to operationalize voluntary action 
using monotonous and random actions. He accepted Libet's (1985) claim 
that such movements, at least some of the time, are initiated unconsciously. 
However, he contended that these unconsciously initiated movements might 
not be completely voluntary. Rather, they appear as such because of the non-
ecological conditions created by Libet's instructions to his subjects to carry 
out voluntary actions, together with the requirement to report the timing 
of their so-called intention to move. This combination, he claims, may have 
retrospectively converted subjects' movements into voluntary actions in their 
minds. 6 For our purposes, Latto's criticism emphasizes the artificial condi-
tions imposed on the participants of the Libet experiments, when instructed 
to report, and thus attend, to the onset of their intention. 
Latto's criticism therefore stresses the possible attentional confound in the 
Libet experiments: to what degree do the results depend on subjects having had 
to attend to their intention to act, because of the instruction to time its onset? 
The answer, claim Miller, Shepherdson, and Trevena (2on), is "to a consider-
able extent"; these researchers showed that the amplitude of the RP was sig-
nificantly smaller when subjects were instructed to only spontaneously press a 
key when compared to being instructed to also monitor the clock. More sup-
port for attention's role in the formation of the RP was found in the study of 
Baker, Piriyapunyaporn, and Cunnington (2012). There, tones that randomly 
lasted either 3.5 or 4.5 s were played to subjects. After each tone, subjects were 
instructed to reproduce the duration of the tone as accurately as possible by the 
duration between two presses of a button. They were asked to wait a bit before 
the first button press and were given feedback on how accurately they replicated 
the tone's duration after the second button press, in every trial. Therefore, the 
timing of the first button press was determined by the subjects at will, while the 
second button press reflected the subjects' best estimate of the tone's length. 
In line with the hypothesis that RP is tightly related to subjects' attention to 
timing, RP before the first button press had a significantly smaller amplitude 
than RP before the second button press.7 The authors thereby concluded that 
attention to the timing of movement is key to a strong RP. This compounds 
the earlier empirical evidence for the role of attention in RP generation, dis-
cussed before (Keller & Heckhausen, 1990).8 Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that even the studies that were critical of the Libet results all found RPs, though 
diminished, before unattended and even possibly before unconscious action. 
A different criticism of the RP was recently made by Schurger, Sitt, and 
Dehaene (2012). They used a task reminiscent of Libet's (i.e., a general 
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instruction to move with no specific movement cue or motivation to 
and constructed a stochastic decision model of neural activity. They 
showed that, in this model, the precise moment when the decision threshold 
was crossed and movement was initiated was mainly determined by sub-
threshold neuronal fluctuations that were completely spontaneous. Critically. 
time-locking this neural activity to movement onset made the fluctuations 
appear, on average, as a gradual increase in neuronal activity-akin to the 
traditional RP. The authors therefore claimed that the RP is an artifact of the 
alignment of the neuronal signal on every trial to movement onset, rather 
than a genuine event-related potential that indexes action initiation. They 
further suggested that the role of spontaneous neural fluctuations in crossing 
the decision threshold is unique to the meaningless and unmotivated move-
ments used in the Libet task. 
Thus, critiques of the Libet experiment mainly focus on two issues. First, 
its reliance on the RP, whose amplitude and sometimes distribution over 
scalp electrodes correlates with the amount of attention that the subject pays 
to various facets of the task. Second, while RP reliably precedes unmoti-
vated voluntary action, it may be no more than artifactual to the manner 
in which it is calculated-averaging over many trials and aligning to move-
ment onset-reflecting the accumulation of noise leading to unmotivated 
decisions. 
4. Follow-up Experiments that Do Not Rely 
on Readiness Potential 
Following this discussion, it seems that the RP does not necessarily reflect 
neural activity related to the initiation of voluntary action. Accordingly, the 
relation between the RP and subjects' conscious decision to act may not be 
so easily interpreted. However, some more recent research no longer relied 
on RP or EEG to investigate the temporal relation between neural precursors 
of action and the reported time of the decision or intention to act. Instead, 
these studies used decoding techniques to decode subjects' upcoming deci-
sions from brain activity that occurred prior to subjects' reported decision 
time. For instance, Fried, Mukamel, and Kreiman (20II) showed that some 
single-neuron activity in the supplementary motor-area ( SMA) and anterior 
cingulate-cortex in humans starts to ramp up about a second before W time 
and movement time. This was suggested to potentially underlie RP in scalp 
EEG (Haggard, 20II). 
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Soon, Brass, Heinze, and Haynes (2008) and Bode et al. (20n) had sub-
jects press one button with their left hand or another with their right at a 
time of their choice, while observing a randomized sequence of letters that 
switched every 0.5 s. Using functional magnetic-resonance imaging (fMRI), 
the investigators showed that there is some information about which hand 
the subjects would eventually use up to 10 s (ten seconds) before movement 
onset from the frontopolar cortex and up to about 8s in advance from the 
SMA. The decoding accuracy was low, at about 60%, but significantly above 
chance. They further found information coding when the subjects would 
move9 up to 7s or so before movement onset in the pre-SMA; decoding ac-
curacy was at roughly 20%, which was significantly above chance level, at 17%. 
These decoding times preceded the reported awareness of the decision when 
and which hand to move by roughly ss and 6s, respectively. 
Two competing interpretations could be proposed for these results, assum-
ing subjects' reports about the timing of their decisions are accurate. The first 
is that the early decoding signals stern from unconscious decision processes 
that preceded subjects' conscious intention to rnove,1° and so unconscious 
brain activity initiated the action. This interpretation leaves less room for ef-
fective, conscious intentions in the causal chain leading to action-at least in 
the case of the unreasoned and unmotivated behavior investigated in these 
experirnents.11 Therefore, it led to a debate about whether the intuitive con-
cept of free will is no more than an illusion (Harris, 2012; Libet, 1985; Mele, 
2006, 2009; Roskies, 2010; Sinnott-Armstrong & Nadel, 20II; Wegner, 2002). 
However, an alternative interpretation is that these decoded signals relied 
on bias activity that has some influence on later action selection but does not 
fully define it. For example, ongoing brain activity may break the symmetry 
or speed up decisions among similarly valued decisions, creating a bias toward 
one of the decision alternatives (Haynes, 20na, 20IIb ). Such a bias may then 
be combined with the values the subject associates with the decision alterna-
tives to determine the decision outcome. The influence of the bias would be 
greater as the values of the decision alternatives become more similar. In this 
vein, we showed that when monkeys were deciding between smaller, more 
immediate rewards and larger, delayed ones, their choices could be decoded 
from single-neuron activity in frontal cortex and the basal ganglia before they 
were even informed of the delays associated with the decision alternatives, and 
hence before rational deliberation could begin. As expected, and as the circuit 
model we devised suggested, the bias activity was more predictive as the values 
of the two alternatives became more similar (Maoz, Kim, Rutishauser, Lee, & 
Koch, 2010; Maoz et al., 2013). In all the Libet experiments and follow-ups 
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discussed above, the values associated with the random left- or right-hand 
movements were generally similar, if not identical. Thus, our results support 
the claim that the early decoding signals found in these studies reflect early 
bias signals rather than early determination of the action. The single-neuron 
activity we found may therefore underlie neural fluctuations that might con-
siderably influence unmotivated decisions about which action to take, simi-
larly to the neural fluctuations that bring about action onset and RP in the 
computational model of Schurger et al. (2012). 
However, importantly, Libet et al. (1983), Haggard and Eimer (1999), 
Soon et al. (2008), Fried et al. (20n) and the other experiments discussed 
earlier focused on random decisions: raising a hand, or one of two hands, for 
no reason or purpose and with no consequences.12 But it is not clear to what 
extent these random decisions generalize to the more interesting deliberate 
decisions humans make every day. In fact, there is some preliminary evidence 
that deliberate and random decisions rely on dissociated neural systems. 13 
5. Criticism of the Use of W Time 
Previously we reviewed some criticism against Libet's experiment, focusing 
on the validity of the RP and other neural markers as precursors of inten-
tion or action as well as on the generalizability of random decisions to de-
liberate ones. But another aspect common to all the Libet-paradigm studies, 
from those based on EEG, through fMRI, to single-neuron recordings, is 
their reliance on Libet's introspective W time to clock the moment subjects 
had the conscious intention to act. So, how valid is W time as a measure of 
conscious-intention onset? 
Measuring W time in the Libet experiment requires subjects to time the 
onset of their intention to act with a rotating clock using introspection, 
commit it to memory, and retrieve it after movement onset. The various stages 
of this process have come under criticism, generally suggesting reasons for the 
onset of intention to have occurred earlier than the W time reported by the 
subjects. But the majority of the criticism focused on the attempt to exter-
nally, yet accurately, time the onset of the intention to act.14 
It was suggested, for instance, that the timing of the intention was biased 
due to its reliance on an external rotating clock together with the internal 
introspection of time (Jasper, 1985; Wasserman, 1985). In particular, concerns 
were raised about the reliability of reports about timing intentions; it was 
claimed that the timing in such reports depends on the subjective threshold 
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that each participant sets for the strength of a conscious urge that merits 
reporting as a full-blown urge, assuming a gradual development of awareness 
(Latto, 1985; Marks, 1985). Doubts were even raised about whether an urge is 
an instantaneous event with a clear onset (Ringo, I985; this claim is elaborated 
later). And it was commented that W time measures the onset of the ability 
to report awareness-sometimes termed meta-awareness-rather than the 
onset of the awareness itself (Rollman, 1985). Other concerns were that the 
attempt to self-monitor an internal process-urge or intention formation in 
this case-may interfere with that process, perhaps because it requires switch-
ing from introspective to visual attention (Wasserman, 1985).15 Another type 
of criticism noted possible temporal discrepancies between the motor (wrist 
Hexion) and sensory (clock-position perception) tasks in the experiment 
(Wasserman, 1985), suggesting that this stems from Libet's views of mental 
processes as instantaneous-that is, not allowing time for their development, 
processing, and propagation (perhaps due to Libet's dualism; Wood, 1985). 
Beyond the early criticism directed at the concepts or experimental setup 
of the Libet paradigm, recent empirical findings further cast doubt on how 
accurately W time measures the onset of the intention to act. Matsuhashi 
and Hallett (2008) instructed subjects to move their finger at a time of their 
choice-as soon as they formed an intention to move-while tones were 
played to them at random times. Importantly, the subjects were required to 
cancel their movement if and only if the tone was played after they formed 
the intention to move. This paradigm allowed the authors to calculate the dis-
tribution of tones in relation to movement onset. And from that distribution 
they were able to compute that the intention to move in fact began already 
1.4s or so before movement onset. This was about I.2 s earlier than W time in 
the Libet experiments, and generally congruent with the onset of the earli-
est part of the RP. These results could be viewed as supporting the idea that 
intention formation is gradual and thus takes time (Latto, 1985; Marks, 1985; 
Wasserman, 1985). The task in Matsuhashi and Hallett's (2008) experiment 
might have thus prompted subjects to report an earlier phase of the intention 
to move than the one reported using W time. 
Further criticism against W time as a measure for intention onset comes 
from a recent study we conducted with consenting intractable epilepsy 
patients, implanted with electrodes as part of their presurgical evaluation. 
The patients played a matching-pennies game. At the beginning of each 
trial, they pressed a button with each hand, and then decided which hand 
they would raise at the go signal, which followed a 5 s countdown. If they 
raised the same hand as their opponent, they won $0.10 from that opponent. 
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Otherwise they lost $0.10 to their opponent. Both players started 
$5.00. If the patient finished the game, which consisted of roughly 50 trials 
with more money than her opponent she received that sum in cash fro~ 
the experimenter. We constructed a system that predicted which hand the 
patients would raise 0.5 s before the go signal online and in real time. Its pre-
diction accuracy was at 70%, on average, over two patients. We also applied 
this system on retrospective data, with more offiine computational power. 
We could then increasingly well decode which hand the patient would 
raise, with the decoding accuracy rising above chance already 4 s or so be-
fore movement onset. The decoding accuracy reached over 82% correct, on 
average, over 7 patients, just before the go signal. If we let the system decode 
only on the 70% of the trials on which it was most confident, its average cor-
rect decoding rate rose to 92% (Maoz et al., 2012). In separate experimental 
sessions, we asked the patients to report when they finalized their decision 
regarding the hand they would raise at the go signal by one of two meth-
ods. One was by remembering the countdown when they decided (the digits 
flipped every 0.5 s)-that is, the Libet condition, though with a digital clock. 
The other was by starting the trial with neither button depressed and then 
pressing both buttons down at the perceived decision onset (and later, as 
usual, raising the chosen hand at the go signal). We found that the decision-
onset time reported for the button-press condition was about 500 ms ear-
lier than for the Libet condition, a statistically significant difference. Banks 
and Isham (20u) also showed that, when measured with a rotating clock, a 
digital clock, and a clock with randomly changing digits, W time preceded 
movement onset by 138 ms, 30 ms, and 380 ms, respectively, on average. So, 
W time appears to depend both on the manner of reporting (recalling the 
countdown at the decision versus pressing buttons as the decision occurred) 
and on the type of clock used to time it. 
Interestingly, in the original Libet experiment, RT preceded W time by 
about 350 ms. So, assuming the results just discussed would generalize to this 
experimental condition, the button-press W time would have preceded RP 
by more than 100 ms. Therefore, had Libet opted for his subjects to report W 
time using button presses (possibly on separate trials, like us, to avoid motion 
artifacts in the EEG recordings), he would have found a result congruent with 
his intuition. Similarly, had Libet used randomly changing digits to clock W 
time, his W time would have preceded RP by about 30 ms. Either way, he may 
well have then decided not to publish such results, and the history of this field 
might have been quite different. 
The conceptual criticisms, experimental suggestions, and experimental evi-
dence suggest that the onset of intention might actually be somewhat earlier 
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rhan measured by W time. But even if the onset of intention leads the W time 
measured in the Libet paradigm by about a second, it still does not invalidate 
results like those of Soon et al. (2008 ), where the temporal gap between the 
decoding of action onset or contents and W time was 4-6 s. 
Nevertheless, other empirical results join these criticisms to cast doubt on 
the validity ofW time as any kind of marker for the onset of intention. Lau, 
Rogers, and Passingham (2007) instructed subjects to carry out the Libet 
experiment while randomly applying transcranial magnetic-stimulation 
(TMS) to their pre-SMA on half the trials (and sham TMS on the other half) 
either immediately or 200 ms after movement onset. They found that TMS 
shifted the perceived onset of motor intention slightly backward in time and 
the perceived onset of action execution slightly forward in time, regardless 
of whether it was applied at movement onset or 200 ms later.16 It therefore 
appears that the perceived onset of intention depends, at least partially, on 
neural activity that took place after the onset of action. 
Even more compelling evidence against W time as a measure of the aware-
ness of intention comes from a study by Banks and Isham (2009 ). There, sub-
jects carried out the Libet experiment, pressing a button that gave no tactile 
feedback, while they could not see their hand. They received either audi-
tory feedback (a beep) or visual feedback (a video of their hand pressing the 
button). Critically, this feedback was deceptive, with the beeps delayed by 5 
to 60 ms, and the video delayed by 120 ms. The results showed that the timing 
of the false feedback significantly influenced subjects' report ofW time: irre-
spective of their actual movement onset, subjects reported W time about 130 
ms before the beep, and about 90 ms before the video began.17 These results 
suggest that rather than being able to accurately time the onset of their inten-
tion to move, subjects rely on sensory information about the timing of action 
execution to infer W time. rs 
It is therefore not clear whether W time refers to anything at all from the 
conceptual point of view. After all, concepts like will, decision, urge, or in-
tention need not necessarily correspond to a specific neural event. The com-
putational, neural mechanism of decision making may well not imitate the 
structure and flow of practical syllogisms19 or of the folk-psychology concep-
tion of intentions or decision making. 
What is more, this folk-psychology notion of decision making appears to 
be a serial account. According to it, information is retrieved from the senses 
and/ or from memory. The alternatives are then weighed and the decision is 
made. This then leads to a commitment to a plan of action-immediate or 
deferred. This account includes a clear onset of the decision and with it the 
intention to act, which W time could then potentially measure. But there 
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is mounting evidence that this serial model of decision making may not 
accurate. Instead, sensory information and the subJ. ects' current state (e 
.g., 
motivation, goals, and so on) are apparently used to continuously main-
tain several conflicting and competing potential action plans in parallel, 
and often by the same brain regions that later control the chosen behavior 
( Cisek & Kalaska, 2orn; Freedman & Assad, 20II; Gold & Shadlen, 2007; 
Kable & Glimcher, 2009; M. N. Shadlen, Kiani, Hanks, & Churchland 
2008; Wise, Boussaoud, Johnson, & Caminiti, 1997 ). These parallel actio~ 
plans appear to be sustained even once the decision has been made and one 
of those potential actions begins to be carried out. Keeping a representa-
tion of the unselected parallel action plans after action onset may facilitate 
quick changes of mind, if required, especially when the decision alternatives 
are associated with similar values for the agent (Resulaj, Kiani, Wolpert, & 
Shadlen, 2009; Selen, Shadlen, & Wolpert, 2012). Hence, a decision might 
be an ongoing, developing process that continuously updates and remains 
amenable to changes, rather than a process that converges to a final unalter-
able outcome at one specific point in time, and is subserved by a definite 
brain area or neural system. If this is the case, it might not be possible to 
clearly map decision and intention onsets onto a single neural process or 
a specific moment in time (Ringo, 1985). In other words, there may be no 
place in the neural causal chain leading to action that can be identified as 
the decision or the intention. 20 
In sum, there are various strong conceptual and empirical criticisms of the 
use that the Libet and follow-up experiments made ofW time. It may even be 
that intentions have no clear neural correlates, in which case it might be futile 
to ask subjects to introspectively time their onset. Or, less radically, even if 
neural correlates of intentions do exist, these may not be all-or-none processes 
that have a clear onset time that W time could capture. Either way, W time 
may well be a folk concept (Banks & Isham, 20n). But, when so instructed, 
subjects generally have no problem reporting W time. Yet, what are they 
reporting? Empirical results suggest that W time may be backward computed 
from movement time after movement onset. And this backward-inferred 
timing may well be the afterthought that the subjects are reporting. 
6. Conclusions 
In the Libet and follow-up experiments, subjects are generally instructed to 
pinpoint when they decided and formed an intention to act using an external 
On Reporting the Onset 195 
dock. However, given the conceptual and experimental criticism cited as well as 
some recent empirical results, this approach appears to rely on a systematically 
biased measure of intention onset, at best; arguably it is worse, and subjects are 
in fact instructed to formulate an artificial mental construct, with no ecological 
validity. Indeed, outside the lab it is not dear that decisions are even accompa-
nied by awareness of the intention to act. Humans do not seem to experience 
finalizing a decision leading to action onset when steering the wheel of a car to 
avoid an obstacle on the road, or when deciding what to wear in the morning (to 
the extent that the results in the Libet experiments generalize to such everyday 
choices). What is more, it is not dear that for the big decisions in life-like 
selecting a partner or career-there is, introspectively, a clear point in time when 
the decision was made, and the plan of action, which was not there a moment 
ago, emerged. 21 So, perhaps, the Li bet experiments, which rely on W time, are 
simply misguided, measuring something that does not independently exist. 
What then should neuroscientists do to investigate the relation between 
awareness of the urge, intention, or decision to act and the neural correlates of 
this action? They should not ask subjects to report intention onset or W time 
during the same trials where they carry out the action, because these reports 
apparently confound the neural precursors of action that are measured in the 
experiment. They also render the experimental task and the action measured 
therein much less ecological, and by that decrease its validity and generaliz-
ability to everyday situations. If one insists that W time is a valid measure, 
previous literature has rather well delineated the distribution ofW times that 
subjects report with respect to movement time for Libet-like tasks. So this 
distribution could be used instead of measuring W time during the experi-
ment, at least when subject-specific or trial-by-trial information about W 
time is not needed. 
A better approach would be to consider decision making a continuous pro-
cess rather than a discrete one. Then, one could identify neural markers that 
track deliberation leading to decisions and reflect the (potentially gradual) 
buildup of intention, to the extent that it exists and is approachable with our 
technology. One idea is to construct a decoder of the upcoming action and 
investigate where its accuracy plateaus in relation to action onset. The mo-
ment where the decoder plateaus would then replace W time as the proxy for 
decision onset. Work of this sort appears to have found correlates of deliber-
ation, in the form of evidence gathering leading to decisions in the monkey 
brain for perceptual judgments (the random dot-motion task), at least for eye 
movements (Gold & Shadlen, 2001, 2007; Shadlen & Newsome, 2001). And 
some work on humans demonstrated encoding of what could be intentions 
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for random decisions (purposeless addition and subtraction of small num-
bers) using fMRI (Haynes et al., 2007; Soon, He, Bode, & Haynes, 2013). 
But the most rigorous and convincing demonstration of such neural markers 
of decisions might be in closed-loop experiments, where these markers are 
identified and analyzed online and in real time (Maoz et al., 2012) and then 
potentially used to control a task on the fly (Cerf et al., 2010 ). Such experi-
ments could, for example, track the neural correlates of decision reversals as 
they occur, and even attempt to influence them. While some work in this 
direction has already been done, much more remains ahead. And neuroscien-
tists should perhaps devote more resources to attempts of this kind instead of 
trying to better understand the relation of neural precursors of action and the 
potentially nonexistent W time. 
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NOTES 
I. We distinguish between voluntary action (sometimes just action) and movement. 
We tend to think that for an action to be voluntary at least one of the following-
whether to carry the action out, when to perform the action, or which action to 
execute-must be up to the agent, in the sense that it depends on the agent's de-
cision or intention (Haggard, 2008). The term movement refers more generally 
to any kind of displacement of body parts due to any cause-voluntary, reflexive, 
following the application of external force, and so on. 
2. The RP is a more complex neural phenomenon than discussed here, possibly com-
posed of an early and late component, for instance. For details, see Shibasaki and 
Hallett, 2006. 
3. While Libet and much of the follow-up literature do not generally distinguish 
between the urge, intention, and decision to move, these concepts are not iden-
tical, which leads to conceptual confusions that permeate the literature. Briefly, 
an intention entails at least a temporary plan to go through with an action, while 
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an urge is the wish to carry out an action or the conscious experience of an imped-
ing intention. Also, by intentions here we mean proximal intentions. For more 
details about these distinctions see Mele, 2009. Nevertheless, it is not clear that 
subjects are able to differentially report the onset of their urges, intentions, and 
decisions. We generally refer to intentions rather than urges or decisions here. 
4. The discovery of the RP enabled neuroscientists to speculate about the neural pro-
cess leading to action. Similarly, a neural marker for intention may allow neuro-
scientist to investigate the brain processes leading to intention onset. However, 
such a neural marker need not be more "genuine" or in any way superior to intro-
spection when it comes to measuring the onset of intention, for instance. And this 
marker may well be no more than a neural correlate of this introspection. 
5. We attempt to describe some key studies pertaining to the Libet experiment here. 
But a full account of the follow-up conceptual and empirical work is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. See Banks and Packett (2007 ), for example, for a review. 
6. Although the conclusions of Keller and Heckhausen (1990) are similar to Latto's 
(1985), they might have not been aware of his criticism, though they do reference 
Libet (1985) and another commentary on it from the same issue. 
7. It should be noted that while the three criticisms cited invoke the effect of atten-
tion to timing, they all focused on different aspects of such attention: Latto (1985) 
discussed attention to the onset of intention. Miller et al. (20n) investigated at-
tention to the W-time clock. And Baker et al. (2012) looked at attention to the 
timing of movements. 
8. Keller and Heckhausen (1990) studied the effect of attention on RP in the main 
task versus the distractor task. 
9. They divided the IO s before movement onset into r.67 s bins, and attempted to 
identify in which of the 6 time bins movement could begin. 
IO. The weak decoding accuracy ( 60% and 20%) would then be attributed to techno-
logical limitations of current brain imaging technologies. 
II. A key concern in case conscious intentions are ineffective for action is what this 
entails for our notions of moral and legal responsibility. For a discussion of the ex-
tent to which these concerns are warranted see Maoz and Yaffe, 2014; Yaffe, 2on. 
12. An exception is Maoz, Ye, Ross, Mamelak, and Koch (2012), which investigated 
predicting decisions in a competitive matching-pennies game and is described in 
this chapter. 
13. Mudrik, Maoz, Yaffe, and Koch, The role of consciousness in deliberate and 
random decisions: an ERP study, in preparation; and Packett and Purdy, 2011. 
14. Although the use of working memory as an indicator of consciousness was also 
found suspect (Jasper, 1985). 
15. This might be part of a cognitive analogue of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle 
(Stamm, 1985). 
16. The effect size in this experiment is small, shifting W time by I0-20 ms. 
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17. The auditory delays were of 5, 20, 40, and 60 ms. And, interestingly, this experi-
mental manipulation had subjects report W times that followed EMG onset 
all but the s ms-delay condition. 
18. Following the results of Sirigu et al. (2004), discussed earlier, it seems that the 
neu~al s.ystem in~olved in generating W time is not the same as that used for gen-
eratmg mformation about the timing of movement onset. 
19. Aristotle suggested representing practical reasoning in syllogistic form, the con-
clusion of which is an action. Thus, for example, the decision to drink a glass of 
water might be compounded from the following argument: ( 1) water can quench 
thirst; ( 2) I am thirsty; (3) this is a glass of water; which together entail the action 
of drinking the water (or forming the intention to drink it). This is similar to the 
manner by which an ordinary syllogism entails its conclusion. However, even if 
this model can be used as a standard for evaluating and justifying rational behavior, 
it is not necessarily an adequate description of the neural mechanisms underlyin 
d . . . g ec1s10ns or act10ns. 
20. While several well-known computational models exist for decision making, it 
appears that they generally assume the serial account of decisions, at least im-
plicitly (e.g., Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Palmer, Huk, & Shadlen, 2005; Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 1998; Wong & Wang, 2006). It would be both interesting and important 
to construct a computational model of decision making with the characteristics 
described above. Potentially more difficult, though possibly more rewarding, 
would be to construct a neural-circuit model of decision making, which would 
be closer to the neural hardware than more abstract models like drift-diffusion or 
race-to-threshold. 
21. Again, such distal, deliberate decisions are conceptually different from the prox-
imal, random ones of the Libet paradigm (Mele, 2009 ), and may well be empiric-
ally different too. 
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